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Introduction 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether it is possible to successfully apply a 
behavior modification strategy to rogue states. The dramatic changes in the international system 
since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the more recent post-9/11 
ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence 
strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new threats. If 
these strategies are viable, how should they be used to influence the most immediate and 
pressing threats—rogue states trafficking in terrorism or weapons of mass destruction?  
This analysis will examine United States’ efforts through four U.S. presidential administrations 
(1986-2004) to convince Libya to cease its support for both international terrorism and the 
production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[1] In this particular case the United States 
was attempting to convince the target state, Libya, to stop an action already underway (support 
for terrorism and/or production of WMD in existing facilities and with existing resources) and also 
deter future support and production.[2] As such, U.S. influence strategy necessarily combined, at 
minimum, compellence (efforts to stop an action already underway) and deterrence (efforts to 
prevent future action). Additionally, the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations also used 
positive incentives in a conditional fashion after Tripoli demonstrated a willingness to change its 
behavior.  
U.S. compellence and deterrence policy was strengthened by the application of UN sanctions. 
Together the combined sanctions set the conditions for Tripoli’s behavior change. Substantive 
changes in Libyan policy regarding terrorism and weapons of mass destruction did not begin, 
however, until the U.S. began a policy of limited and incremental conditional engagement. Future 
policymakers should take from this case study an understanding that punitive measures such as 
sanctions, especially when backed by the international community, can be successful in 
achieving a limited goal of diplomatic and economic isolation. However, punitive measures alone 
may not be sufficient to facilitate recognizable and concrete behavior change in a target state. As 
this case demonstrates, when the right conditions have been established through punitive 
measures like sanctions, positive incentives offered in a conditional and incrementalized fashion 
can both build trust between the influencing and target state and move the target state towards 
committed and concrete behavior change.  
Rogue States, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Though there is not one accepted definition of a rogue state,[3] qualification for the designation 
generally includes the production or purchase of WMD and links to terrorist organizations.[4] The 
U.S. government, arguably the largest proponent of the rogue state classification, defined the 
term in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). 
Essentially, rogue states are those who: 
1. reject international oversight and controls on WMD;  
2. have demonstrated a willingness to pursue the development and/or weaponization of 
WMD; and  
3. have links to terrorist organizations, be it in providing safe-haven for terrorist training and 
operations, or through financial support.[5]  
Given the threat that rogue states pose, it is important that the United States be able to 
successfully influence rogue state behavior. In a best-case scenario, a successful influence 
strategy could make it unnecessary for the United States to resort to war and its associated costs 
and risks to influence international outcomes. It is, therefore, within the U.S. national interest to 
maintain an ability to influence rogue state behavior.  
U.S. Influence Strategy Assessment (1986-2004)  
On April 5, 1999, after 13 years of U.S. sanctions and 7 years of UN sanctions, the Libyan 
government turned over to British authorities two suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 
flight 103. Four years later, on December 19, 2003, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman 
Shalqam announced his government’s decision to discontinue its production of weapons of mass 
destruction.[6] What happened in those many years to cause a change in Libyan policy with 
respect to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction?  
Reagan Administration Influence Strategy Assessment 
U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated significantly during the Reagan Administration. After numerous 
terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and interests overseas, the Reagan Administration, 
convinced of Libyan complicity, applied a strategy of deterrence and compellence to both punish 
Tripoli for their support of terrorist groups such as Abu Nidal, and also to deter future support. 
This policy was applied beginning in 1986 with Executive Orders 12543 and 12544—both of 
which established economic and diplomatic sanctions against Tripoli. In its compellence strategy, 
the Reagan Administration went so far as to conduct air strikes against Libyan terrorism-related 
targets in Benghazi and Tripoli.[7]  
This use of force was useful later to back up Reagan’s threats against the newly discovered 
chemical weapons complex at Rabta. With terrorism as their primary concern, the Reagan 
Administration applied the same terrorism-based compellence and deterrence policy to Libya ’s 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In the end, however, the policy failed to facilitate any 
substantial change in Libyan behavior on either issue. Though there was a lull in activity after the 
1986 U.S. air strikes, the Libyan government demonstrated its continued involvement in terrorism 
with the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings. Furthermore, though Libya would cease activity at 
the Rabta chemical plant in the early nineties, they subsequently began construction on a 
hardened, underground chemical weapons complex in Tarhuna.  
George H.W. Bush Administration Influence Strategy Assessment 
U.S.-Libyan relations during the first Bush Administration were characterized initially by rhetorical 
and diplomatic exchanges over WMD, specifically indications of Libyan intent to develop chemical 
weapons at the Rabta Plant. Later, after the November 14, 1991 indictment of two Libyans for the 
Pan Am 103 bombing, Libyan sponsorship of terrorism again took center stage in U.S. influence 
policy. The primary U.S. actions taken during this period included continued support for the 
national state of emergency and economic sanctions established with Executive Orders 12543 
and 12544, increased flight restrictions on aircraft going to or coming from Libya (April 1992)[8], 
and the freezing of an additional $260 million in Libyan assets (for a total of $950 million).[9]  
There were no exchanges of force between Libya and the United States during the Bush 
Administration, though notably, the U.S. did conduct their largest and most successful military 
operation since Vietnam—Operation Desert Storm. The most significant event during this period 
with respect to the U.S. influence strategy against Libya was the imposition of UN sanctions 
against Libya. The United States and United Kingdom were instrumental in the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 731, a resolution formally calling on Libya to support the 
Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombing investigations. Libyan refusal to comply with UN demands 
resulted in the passage of multilateral international sanctions (UNSCR 748).  
The primary success of the U.S. influence strategy during this period was gaining the support of 
the international community in actions against Libya, namely in the passage of UNSCRs 731 and 
748. The Bush Administration for their part did maintain the strength of the U.S. sanctions against 
Libya and added to them the additional concern of Libyan chemical weapons production. Though 
these sanctions, both U.S. and UN, would appear to be ineffective in facilitating Libyan behavior 
change during the Bush Administration, they would prove effective in the longer term.  
William Clinton Administration Influence Strategy Assessment 
Despite the discovery of continued Libyan efforts to develop their chemical weapons 
capability,[10] the primary source of friction between the United States and Libya during the 
Clinton Administration was Libya’s continued support to terrorism—more specifically, their 
unwillingness to renounce terrorism and support the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 investigations as 
mandated in UNSCRs 713 and 748. At the outset of his administration, President Clinton called 
for tightening international sanctions against Libya, including a worldwide oil embargo. Though an 
oil embargo was never agreed upon, the United Nations did strengthen punitive measures 
against Libya with the passage of Resolution 883 (November 1993). Clinton also tightened U.S. 
sanctions in 1996 with the establishment of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). In an effort to 
limit cash inflows to the Iranian and Libyan regimes, this very controversial legislation applied 
sanctions to non-U.S. corporations for investing in Iran and Libya.[11]  
Clinton’s continual pressure on Libya and his pressure on the international community to 
strengthen sanctions against Libya helped to continue the economic and diplomatic isolation of 
the Qadhafi regime. Though this was integral to achieving the U.S. government’s objective of 
limiting Qadhafi’s ability to sponsor terrorism, it was not effective, even after ten years (1988-
1998), in forcefully persuading Qadhafi to comply with the Pan Am 103 trial, much less in leading 
the Libyan government to a renunciation of terrorism. At best, the compellence and deterrence 
policy set the conditions in Libya through diplomatic and economic isolation for a favorable Libyan 
response to a strategy of limited conditional engagement.  
U.S. influence strategy began to take a turn in late 1998 when the Clinton Administration took the 
first steps toward conditional engagement with Libya. In an effort described by Secretary of State 
Albright as “a way to call the Libyan Government’s bluff,” the Clinton Administration acceded to 
Libya’s demand that the Pan Am 103 trial be moved to a neutral third country—the Netherlands—
in exchange for the handover of the suspects.[12] In April of 1999, Qadhafi handed over the two 
suspects for trial, resulting in the suspension of UN sanctions. Later that same month, the Clinton 
Administration modified U.S. sanctions, but did not lift them, arguing that Libya still had to fulfill 
remaining UN requirements, the renunciation of terrorism, cessation of support to terrorist 
activities, and full compliance with the Pan Am and UTA investigations. Further, the U.S. required 
that Libya accept responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and pay compensation to victim’s 
families.  
Clinton’s pursuit of limited conditional engagement opened the door to a series of small put 
positive steps by both states. In addition to handing over the Lockerbie suspects, Qadhafi closed 
the Libyan training camps of infamous international terrorist Abu Nidal. The Clinton Administration 
perceived this move as a concrete step toward renouncing terrorism.[13] In response, the Clinton 
Administration modified U.S. sanctions, did not object at the suspension of UN sanctions, and 
also allowed four U.S. oil companies to travel to Libya to assess the status of their holdings. 
Though these were small steps, they were steps towards facilitating the U.S. and internationally 
desired behavior change in Libya. Furthermore, though Libya did not meet all UN and U.S. 
requirements during the Clinton Administration, the door was opened to further conditional 
engagement between the U.S. and Libya.  
George W. Bush Administration Influence Strategy Assessment 
The Bush Administration was able to achieve the long sought after goal of Libyan behavior 
change. In August of 2003, the Libyan government accepted formal responsibility for the actions 
of convicted Lockerbie bomber, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi, and agreed to pay compensation to 
the families of those killed in the attack.[14] In December of 2003 and later in May of 2004, the 
Libyan government renounced its pursuit of WMD, acceded to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and announced it would stop all military-related trade with suspected WMD and 
missile proliferators North Korea, Iran, and Syria.[15] The George W. Bush Administration did not 
facilitate this change in Libya by its policy alone; rather, Bush built upon the influence strategy 
created and shaped by the Reagan, Bush senior, and Clinton administrations. Furthermore, the 
second Bush Administration benefited greatly from British diplomatic efforts to facilitate 
communication between Washington and Tripoli.[16]  
Having thus established that George W. Bush did not single-handedly bring Libya to the 
negotiating table, it is important to note a few unique contributions from the second Bush 
Administration that likely tipped the scale toward reconciliation. First, Bush’s hard rhetoric and 
strong actions against other rogue regimes, including two major military operations in the larger 
Global War on Terror, provided for a bonus coercive effect on Libyan behavior.[17] Second, 
Bush’s willingness to continue conditional engagement with Libya, despite his hardline stance on 
rogue states, allowed for continued trust building and dialogue between the two states, paving the 
way for Libyan renunciation of terrorism and WMD .  
The sea change in U.S. foreign policy resulting from the 9/11 attacks and the demonstration of 
U.S. resolve in fighting terrorism and WMD lent credibility to Bush’s hardline stance on sanctions 
against Libya. He clearly was resolved that U.S. sanctions would not be modified until Libya met 
all its UN requirements with respect to terrorism and U.S. requirements regarding both terrorism 
and WMD. When Libya demonstrated a willingness to move forward with reentry into the 
international community, the Bush Administration reciprocated these positive steps with rewards 
and assurances of better relations with continued behavior change. Both states were ready to 
rehabilitate the relationship, though slowly and through trust building measures. The result was 
Libya’s renunciation of terrorism and WMD.  
 
Conclusion  
U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success. The 
compellence and deterrence policies established under President Reagan and strengthened by 
later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically. U.S. compellence 
and deterrence measures were oriented towards increasing the cost of Libyan support of 
terrorism and indigenous WMD programs through military strikes and economic and diplomatic 
isolation. Tripoli’s own culpability in the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 served to work 
against any efforts to remove sanctions by galvanizing the international community against 
Libyan support to terrorism. The Libyan government’s subsequent unwillingness to meet United 
Nations' demands regarding support of terrorism in general, and the Pan Am and UTA bombings 
in particular, strengthened and extended UN sanctions, resulting in eleven years of multilateral 
isolation.  
The cumulative effect of the U.S. and UN sanctions was to set the conditions for Libyan behavior 
change. This change began with the Clinton Administration’s introduction of limited conditional 
engagement. After the Clinton Administration acceded to Libyan demands that the Pan Am 103 
trial be held in a neutral third country, the Libyan government handed over the two suspects for 
trial. This was the beginning of many small but concrete steps towards Libya’s reconciliation with 
the United States and the international community. The George W. Bush Administration, 
benefiting from years of Libyan isolation, Tripoli’s positive response to conditional engagement, 
and British diplomatic help, continued the engagement in an incremental fashion. Backed up by 
credible, post-9/11 threats of forceful intervention, the Bush Administration clearly laid out the 
steps necessary for the removal of U.S. sanctions: acknowledgement of responsibility for the Pan 
Am 103 bombing and payment of restitution to victim families, concrete evidence of a 
renunciation of terrorism, and renunciation and disclosure of weapons of mass destruction 
programs.  
Libya has taken actionable steps to demonstrate a change of policy concerning both terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction. As of September 20, 2004, the Bush Administration lifted both 
the remaining air travel restrictions and the freeze on Libyan assets, estimated at approximately 
$1.25 billion.[18] As part of the road-map agreement, this action will result in the release of 
additional monies to Pan Am 103 families.[19] Though Libya remains on the U.S. State 
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, Secretary Powell indicated they are making 
progress towards removal. Speaking of the future and referencing the ongoing policy of 
incrementalized engagement, Powell is hopeful: "…frankly, we’re impressed with what they have 
done in recent years: resolved the Pan Am 103 case, turned in all their weapons of mass 
destruction… We’ve laid out a clear roadmap for them of what we expect them to do in order to 
move toward full normalization of relations between the United States and Libya… The Libyans 
have been forthcoming. We have been forthcoming… I think it’s in our interest to receive Libya 
back into the international community."[20]  
Policy Recommendations  
It is important that the United States be able to successfully influence rogue state behavior. Not 
only do rogue states pose a near to long term threat to U.S. interests, successfully influencing 
them could prevent the United States from having to resort to war to influence international 
outcomes. What can policy makers glean from this analysis to help them in formulating future 
influence efforts? This analysis leads to three recommendations:  
 
 
1. Sanctions can be effective in setting conditions for behavior change in rogue states; 
however, sanctions should be as multilateral as possible, preferable with United Nations 
backing.  
As demonstrated in the Libya case, sanctions were effective in isolating Libya, thus setting the 
conditions for behavior change. Because sanctions or other punitive measure can be critical to 
setting initial conditions, it is important that they be as effectively applied as possible. One of the 
best ways to ensure effective application is through a multilateral approach. With increasing 
globalization and different approaches to managing threats (engagement vs. coercion), unilateral 
U.S. sanctions alone may not be sufficient to isolate a regime economically and politically.  
2. If punitive measures are used to set conditions for behavior change, these measures 
may require extended periods of time to be effective.  
The primary punitive measures used by the U.S. against Libya were economic and diplomatic 
sanctions. U.S. sanctions had been applied for 13 years and UN sanctions for seven years before 
Libya took the fi rst steps towards meeting international demands regarding their support for 
terrorism.  
3. Sticks alone may not result in positive behavior change by rogue states. After 
appropriate conditions have been set, a carefully crafted engagement strategy should be 
used in conjunction with compellence and deterrence to facilitate behavior change.  
With Libya, positive steps towards first renunciation of terrorism and later WMD did not happen 
until the U.S. modified its influence strategy and pursued limited conditional engagement. With 
rogue states, engagement should be conditional, requiring very specific and incremental 
reciprocal steps in exchange for positive incentives. Pursuing this kind of engagement allows for 
verification of actions and trust building by both sides. Finally, it is important to remember that 
engagement was not pursued by the U.S. until the compellence and deterrence policy had set the 
conditions for Libyan behavior change.  
  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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